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Abstract—Authenticated encryption (AE) schemes are symmetric key cryptographic methods that support confidentiality,
integrity and source authentication. There are many AE algorithms in existence today, in part thanks to the CAESAR
competition for authenticated encryption, which is in its final
stage. In our previous work we introduced a novel AE algorithm
MK-3 (not part of the CAESAR competition), which is based
on the duplex sponge construction and it is using novel large
16×16 AES-like S-boxes. Unlike most AE schemes, MK-3 scheme
provides additional customization features for users who desire
unique solutions. This makes it well suited for government and
military applications. In this paper, we develop a new arraybased statistical analysis approach to evaluate randomness of
cryptographic primitives and show its effectiveness in the analysis
of MK-3. One of the strengths of this method is that it focuses on
the randomness of cryptographic primitive function rather than
only on the randomness of the output.

I. I NTRODUCTION
The overarching goal of symmetric key cryptography is to
enable private communication over an insecure channel in the
presence of adversaries. Two fundamental requirements for
achieving this goal are encryption and authentication. Encryption provides confidentiality while authentication provides data
integrity and assurance of message origin [1].
Many authenticated encryption algorithms are in existence
today, but they are often unsatisfactory in terms of performance, security, or ease of use. Some algorithms require two
passes per block of plaintext to encrypt and authenticate.
This is generally undesirable because it often means a slower
algorithm. Some algorithms have been shown to be insecure
or difficult to use properly. Many algorithms, such as the
ones based on generic composition, require two unique and
unrelated keys. This should be avoided whenever possible
because key management is a difficult problem [2].
Furthermore, new authenticated encryption algorithms are
needed that meet the stringent requirements of government
and military applications. Such algorithms are typically not in
the public domain. The goal of such restriction is to reduce
or eliminate academic interest in cryptanalyzing the algorithm
and publishing results about it [3]. Our previous work consisted of designing the MK-3 authenticated encryption scheme
satisfying all of the above [4], [5].
In this paper, we study randomness of the mapping between
the key, plaintext and cipertext as defined by the MK-3 scheme

using a new array-based statistical method described in the
following.
In the process of checking randomness of cryptographic
primitive functions, various inputs are selected, and then
randomness of the resulting outputs is checked. This task is
computationally intensive, since we want to check a large
number of possible inputs. Hence, it is important to use efficient techniques, which, in turn, increases chances of detecting
non-random behavior. The main purpose of the array-based
approach is to improve the efficiency of this process. This
approach is a follow-up to some ideas presented in [6], [7]
We start with a simple scenario, where a cryptographic
primitive function can be represented as a function of two
inputs, the key and the plaintext, with the ciphertext being
the output of that function. The two inputs will be denoted
as A and B, and the cryptographic function output will be
written as Y = f (A, B). Since Y consists of N bits, we will
treat it as an N -dimensional vector of bits. The inputs A, B
consist of K bits each and will be treated as K-dimensional
vectors. In the array-based approach, we use sequences of
vector inputs Ai , i = 1, . . . , I and Bj , j = 1, . . . , J, and
produce the outputs Yn,i,j , for all possible pairs (i, j) and
n = 1, . . . , N , where Yn,i,j represents the n-th bit of the
output for Ai and Bj . The values of Yn,i,j can be arranged
into a 3-dimensional array, and the statistical testing is done
along various dimensions of that array. For example, we can fix
the value of j and test randomness of the bit-array consisting
of N · I bit positions
[Yn,i,j0 ]n=1,...,N ;i=1,...,I .

(1)

This testing would be repeated J times for all possible
values of j0 . Due to performing many statistical tests here, the
critical values for randomness detection need to be adjusted
for the multiple inference effect, which we do here using
the Bonferroni approach. When D instances of hypothesis
testing are performed, the probability of type I error of each
individual test needs to be set to α/D in order to obtain the
joint probability of one or more type I errors (in all D instances
of hypothesis testing) that is not larger than α. See [8] for more
details.
In a similar fashion, other dimensions can have a fixed
value, and the corresponding bit-array is tested. Two dimen-

sions can also be fixed, so that the set of bits for testing is
selected based on changing the third dimension. For example,
we could fix i at i0 , j at j0 and the bit positions for testing
randomness would become
[Yn,i0 ,j0 ]n=1,...,N .

(2)

One advantage of this array-based approach is that we
have a potential to detect non-randomness in a more selective
fashion. For example, if the non-randomness occurs only for a
certain value of input B being tested, this would be detected.
On the other hand, if the sequence of all bits Yn,i,j is tested,
this non-randomness might not be detected, since it could
potentially be masked by the remaining random data.
In our testing, we focused on the inputs that were nonrandom. Using a random selection of inputs is detrimental to
an efficient process of detection of non-randomness. It is not
surprising to see random output from random inputs, even if
the function is non-random. An extreme example is that of
the identity transformation, where the output would be taken
as a concatenation of the two inputs. In this case, the outputs
from random inputs would also be random, even though the
function is highly non-random.
II. MK-3 AE A LGORITHM
The MK-3 algorithm is a single pass authenticated encryption algorithm designed with hardware implementation in
mind. The core of MK-3 is a permutation function f comprised
of 4 transformations, which are computed on a 512-bit state
split into 16-bit words. This permutation function f is used
as the core of a duplex sponge construction [9]. The sponge
is a relatively new primitive made popular by Keccak, the
winner of the SHA-3 competition [10]. The sponge is unique
in that it can be configured to allow for a variety of different
cryptographic uses. It has an internal state S comprised of b
bits split into a rate r and capacity c, such that b = r+c. Basic
sponge construction consist of two stages. Data is ”absorbed”
into the sponge by passing it through the underlying function
f in r-bit length blocks. It is then ”squeezed” out, generating
output of arbitrary length specified at run time. The duplex
sponge construction is a slight modification of the sponge
which maintains state between calls while absorbing and
squeezing the data during each iteration [9]. Figure 1 illustrates this approach in the context of the MK-3 authenticated
encryption scheme, where AE functionality can be achieved
through successive duplexing calls with the key, initialization
vector (IV), additional authenticated data (AAD) and blocks of
the plaintext (Mi ). Each absorbed r-bit plaintext block Mi is
used to produce one ciphertext block Ci , and the authentication
tag T is outputed at the end.
Pseudocode of the permutation f is given in Algorithm 1
and an illustration of a round operation is presented in Figure
2. The first transformation of Algorithm 1 is non-linear. It
passes each 16-bit state word through an S-box (line 7). The
S-box returns the modular inverse of the input multiplied by
a transformation matrix and added to an offset vector. After

Algorithm 1 MK3 Permutation f
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:

Nr ← 10 (or 16)
⊲ number of rounds
Nb ← 512
⊲ number of bits in state
Nw ← 32
⊲ number of 16-bit words in state
function f (S)
⊲ permute state S in place
for r ← 1, Nr do
for i ← 0, Nw − 1 do
⊲ substitution step S
S.word[i] ← sbox(S.word[i])
end for
S ′ ← S.copy()
for b ← 0, Nb − 1 do
⊲ permutation step π
b′ ← (31b + 15) mod 512
Sb ← Sb′ ′
end for
for j ← 0, Nw /2 − 1 do
⊲ mix step M
i ← 2j
(S.word[i], S.word[i + 1])
← mix(S.word[i], S.word[i + 1])
end for
S ← S ⊕ RC[r]
⊲ add round constant
end for
end function

substitution, the data is permuted by passing it to the affine
function π(x) = 31x + 15 mod 512 (lines 11–12). The data
is then mixed, providing local diffusion. Neighboring pairs of
words are mixed together to produce two new words (lines
15–17) which are passed onto the next step. Finally, a round
constant is added to the state (line 19).
The security level of a keyed sponge was shown by Jovanovic et. al [11] to be
min(2(r+c)/2 , 2c , 2|K| ).
The duplex sponge construction we use is the same as keyed
sponge for the first application of permutation, and thus this
security claim holds for one-block message. For general case
of duplex more thorough argument is needed as in [9].
The MK-3 scheme allows for keys K of length 128 and
256 bits. In both cases the rate r is kept at 128 bits and
c = 384, which permits for simple transitioning between
the two key lengths. The operational difference in MK-3
between key sizes is the number of rounds Nr which are
iterated while computing f , namely using a 128-bit key
requires 10 rounds while 256-bit key requires 16 rounds. The
number of rounds was determined by calculating the linear
and differential complexity over a number of rounds until it
exceeds the generic security of the algorithm [4]. Differential
and linear cryptanalysis of MK-3 showed that 6 and 12 rounds
are required to obtain a level of security above 2128 and 2256 ,
respectively. The additional 4 rounds for each key size are
used to further increase the security margin.
1) Substitution Step: A substitution box aims to provide a
non-linear operation to a cryptographic function. Generally, an
S-box takes in k bits of input and produces l bits. Although k
and l need not be equal, they are equal in both the AES and

Figure 1: The duplex construction

use the Extended Euclid Algorithm. This is a fine solution for
software, however it is very complex to implement in hardware, especially over 16-bit elements. To reduce complexity,
a non-standard composite field construction can be used to
directly solve for the inverse [4].
2) Permutation Step: After passing each word of the state
through an S-box, the state bits are permuted by π(x) =
31x + 15 mod 512. In hardware this is a reordering of wires
according to π(x).
3) Mixing Step: Mixing functions operate over pairs of
16-bit state words. The mixer’s operation consists of the
multiplication of a 2 × 2 matrix of elements in the Galois
field GF (216 ) by the vector containing two consecutive state
words (3). The Galois field GF (216 ) is represented by using
irreducible polynomial q(x) = x16 + x5 + x3 + x2 + 1. The
two output words A′ , B ′ of the mixing step are given by
  
 ′ 
1
x
A
A
=
×
.
(3)
B′
x x+1
B
Figure 2: MK-3 round operation

MK-3, with k = l = 8 and k = l = 16, respectively. MK-3 is
the first cryptographic algorithm to our knowledge to employ
larger than 8-bit S-boxes [4]. The construction of 16-bit Sboxes for MK-3 was presented by Wood et al. in [12]. These
S-boxes, similarly as the AES S-box, find the inverse of the
input and pass it through an affine transformation. The default
case for MK-3 is:
 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0   x15 −1  0 
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 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1  ×  x7 
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 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1   x3 

1

 00 
0
1
0
 
⊕  11  .
0
1
1
0
1
1
1

A common way of finding the multiplicative inverse is to

After the mixing step, the entire state has a 512-bit constant
added to it with bitwise ⊕ (XOR). The constants are derived
using Keccak, the SHA-3 competition winner. Each round
constant RCi is the output of Keccak calculated for the ASCII
value of the round number [4].
III. MK-3 S TATISTICAL A NALYSIS
A. Data Generation Process
For the purpose of checking randomness of MK-3, we used
an approach depicted in Figure 3. The inputs A and B are
as described in the introduction section, and the whole state
C consisting of 512 bits is used as the Y output.
In order to generate a sequence of inputs Ai , i = 1, . . . , I,
we started with a sequence of 128 zero bits as the A1 vector.
Then we defined A2 vector by flipping the first bit of A1 to 1,
defined A3 vector by flipping the second bit of A1 to 1, and
so on, for all 128 bits of A1 . This resulted in 129 vectors Ai ,
for i = 1, . . . , 129. Note that each Ai for i > 1 has exactly
one bit equal to 1. The inputs B were defined in the same way,
so Bi = Ai , for i = 1, . . . , 129. The f function (see its use in
Figure 3) was calculated using k rounds, for k ranging from
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The first step in our randomness checking was to test the
frequency of 1’s against the expected statistical variability. The
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129 · 129 bits of the array
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notation ignores the dependence on the number of rounds, k).
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Figure 4: Frequency of 1’s accross all bit positions for 1 and
2 rounds

[Yn0 ,i,j ]i=1,...,129,j=1,...,129 ,
where n0 is the index shown on the horizontal axis. The
horizontal dashed lines mark the limits of the acceptable
statistical variability, which were calculated as
0.5 ± s · z(1 − 0.05/2D)
(4)
p
for s = 0.25/m, where m is the number of bits being tested
for the frequency of 1’s (here m = 129·129), D is the number
of multiple comparisons being performed (here D = 512),
and z(α) is the α level percentile from the standard normal
distribution. The limits in (4) are calculated based on the
normal approximation of the thresholds for rejection of the null
hypothesis that the probability of observing the value 1 is equal
to 0.5. The Bonferroni adjustment was explained in Section
I and more details are given in [8]. Observed frequencies of
1’s out side of the limits defined in (4) point to nonrandom
behavior.
We can see in the top panel of Figure 4 that the majority
of the frequencies are outside of the acceptable limits for the
case of only one round. This points to some non-randomness
when only one round of the algorithm is being used. The
second panel of Figure 4 shows analogous results when two
rounds are being used. Again, we can see a fair amount of nonrandomness in the data. Figure 5 shows analogous results for
cases when three and four rounds are being used, respectively.

This time, all frequencies are within the acceptable limits of
variability. We don’t show the results with more rounds, since
they look similar to those in Figure 5, and again no nonrandomness was detected in those cases.
Figure 6 shows the frequency of 1’s among 512 · 129
bits of [Yn,i,j0 ]n=1,...,512,i=1,...,129 , where j0 is the column
index (representing the index of the B input) shown on the
horizontal axis. The limits of the acceptable variability are
again calculated based on (4), however here m = 512 · 129
and D = 129. The top panel of Figure 6 shows some nonrandom patterns, when only one round is being used. On the
other hand, two rounds are sufficient, in this case, in order
to generate frequencies within the acceptable range. We also
observe it for 3 and 4 rounds (see Figure 7) and for more
rounds up to 10.
Figures analogous to 6 and 7 were also created (but not
shown here) in order to show the frequency of 1’s among 512·
129 bits of [Yn,i0 ,j ]n=1,...,512,j=1,...,129 , where i0 is the row
index (representing the index of the A input) on the horizontal
axis. Those figures are not shown here, since they show results
very similar to those shown in Figures 6 and 7.
We also considered patterns in several consecutive bits. For
example, in random data, we should observe two-bit pattern
00 in approximately 25 percent of cases. The same is true
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Figure 5: Frequency of 1’s accross all bit positions for 3 and
4 rounds
number of bits H
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

number of rounds
1
2
3-10
2006
1804
0
4096
2158
0
7815
931
0
1025
919
0
1029
907
0
1026
891
0
1034
883
0
1025
843
0
1032
828
0

60
Column No.

Figure 6: Frequency of 1’s accross B inputs for 1 and 2 rounds
number of bits H
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

number of rounds
1
2
3-10
11
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Table II: Number of non-random cases across B inputs

Table I: Number of non-random cases across a fixed bit
position of the output

for the remaining patterns 01, 10, and 11. We explore here
H consecutive bits, where H = 2, . . . , 10, with 2H possible
patterns in each case. The randomness is assessed based on
staying within the acceptable limits defined in a way similar
to formula (4), which now takes the form
p0 ± s · z(1 − 0.05/2D),
(5)
p
for p0 = 2−H and s = p0 · (1 − p0 )/m, where m is the
number of tested patterns, and the remaining notation is the
same as that for (4). The number of non-random cases is
summarized in Table I for testing across a fixed bit position of
the output. The total number of cases is given by D = 512·2H

and m = ⌊129·129/H⌋. We observe non-random cases for up
to two rounds only. Table II shows analogous counts of nonrandom cases across columns (B inputs). Here D = 129 · 2H
and m = ⌊512 · 129/H⌋. We observe non-randomness only
for some cases when using one round.
Table III shows analogous counts of non-random cases
across rows (A inputs). Here the values of D and m are
the same as those for the case of Table II. This time, nonrandomness is observed only for up to two rounds.
IV. C ONCLUSIONS AND F UTURE W ORK
The new array-based statistical analysis approach developed
in this paper confirms the desired randomness properties of
the MK-3 scheme, when at least three rounds are used. This
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Figure 7: Frequency of 1’s accross B inputs for 3 and 4 rounds
number of bits H
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

number of rounds
1
2
3-10
322
61
0
564
20
0
783
0
0
910
0
0
487
0
0
369
0
0
312
0
0
183
0
0
78
0
0

Table III: Number of non-random cases across A inputs

new array-based approach is very general and can be used
for checking randomness of other cryptographic primitives
in a variety of contexts. However, depending on the type of
the cryptographic primitive and the statistical tests used, this
approach may require some customization. This will be the
subject of our future research.
Independently, further cryptanalysis of the MK-3 scheme
should be performed on its customized versions, including
statistical analysis as in this paper.
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